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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Survey period, the Texas courts were busy shaping and refin-
ing personal tort law with the greatest development focusing on
the legal contours of the duty of care in negligence actions. This
article begins by discussing various cases defining one's duty of care in
premises liability actions, including duty of private businesses and prem-
ises owners,1 as well as duty of the sovereign. 2 It next discusses cases
considering duty to warn within the context of the learned intermediary
doctrine. 3 The article then turns to the Texas courts' consideration of the
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1. See infra Part II. A.
2. See infra Part II. B.
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statute of repose in the medical malpractice context 4 and concludes with
a discussion of cases dealing with the tort of wrongful discharge-a
unique tort representing an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
in Texas.5
II. DUTY OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
A. DUTY OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES OR PREMISES OWNERS
In Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith,6 the Texas Supreme Court ex-
amined whether owners and operators of a bar have a duty to protect
patrons from imminent assault by a fellow guest.7 The majority's decision
precipitated the filing of three dissenting opinions,8 as justices sparred
over the appropriate standard of care owed to a bar patron injured in a
melee among drunken bar patrons. 9
Late one evening, about an hour before the defendant bar's closing
time, tensions escalated between two groups at the Grandstand Bar on
defendant Del Lago's resort property.10 Present was a group of fraternity
members celebrating their organization's 40th anniversary as well as a
separate wedding party, which arrived at the bar late into the evening.11
Verbal confrontations between the two parties commenced almost imme-
diately after the wedding party arrived. After at least ninety minutes of
heated exchanges between the parties (including posturing, cursing, and
name-calling), a physical fight broke out. 12 Bradley Smith, a member of
the fraternity, was seriously injured when he attempted to rescue a fellow
fraternity brother, who Smith knew suffered from a heart condition. 13
An unidentified person rammed Smith's head into a wall stud, fracturing
Smith's skull and causing brain damage.14 Smith sued the bar pursuant to
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010).
7. Id. at 764.
8. See id. at 777, 780 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority improperly states
the applicable duty owed, ignores the plaintiff's burden to prove the defendant failed to
use ordinary care, and overlooks the insufficiency of evidence regarding proximate causa-
tion); id. at 787, 791 (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (concluding the claim was improperly
submitted under a premises liability theory rather than a negligent activity theory); id. at
796-97 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's holding a "non-rule," which deviates
from Texas law and fails to provide landowners with clear guidelines).
9. Id. at 770 (deciding a duty arose to use reasonable care to protect bar patrons from
imminent assault during ninety minutes of heated altercations); id. at 782 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (stating the landowner does not have a duty to warn an invitee of open and
obvious conditions, or of conditions of which the invitee has knowledge); id. at 787 (Wain-
wright, J., dissenting) (concluding the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of an unrea-
sonable risk of serious harm, and thus the defendant bar did not owe him a duty); id. at 799
(Hecht, J., dissenting) (asserting the law is settled in Texas that a landowner "must either
adequately warn" an invitee of an unreasonably dangerous condition or "make the condi-
tion reasonably safe," but there is no requirement to do both).
10. Id. at 765.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 765-66.




a premises liability theory.15 After a lengthy jury trial, the jury appor-
tioned 49% of the fault to Smith and 51% to the defendant bar, imposing
liability against the bar.' 6
In Texas, a premises liability action is based in negligence, with the
scope of the legal duty owed to a plaintiff defined by the plaintiff's status
at the time of the injury.17 The plaintiff in Del Lago was properly charac-
terized as an invitee, and as such the defendant bar owed him the "duty
to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm
... about which the [bar] owner knew" or should have been aware. 18
The primary issue with which the supreme court grappled was whether
a defendant had a duty to warn when the plaintiff himself is aware of a
criminal act that may constitute a risk of harm. The majority held that
under the circumstances, the bar owner had a duty to take reasonable
steps to protect the plaintiff from the imminent threat of battery
presented by the bar fight. 19 Expressly limiting its holding to the specific
facts of this case, 20 the Del Lago majority held the bar owed Smith a duty
to use reasonable care to protect him from the imminent assault, despite
Smith being aware of the potential risk.21 The bar owner's "duty arose
because the likelihood and magnitude of the risk to patrons reached the
level of an unreasonable risk of harm, the risk was apparent to the prop-
erty owner, and the risk arose in circumstances where the property owner
had readily available opportunities to reduce it."'22
The supreme court's decision is substantial to developing personal in-
jury tort law because ordinarily a landowner has no duty to protect invi-
tees from criminal acts of third parties. 23 Texas courts have previously
recognized an exception to this general no-duty rule: "[o]ne who controls
... premises [has] a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from
criminal acts of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an
15. Id. at 767. Smith initially put forward a premises liability theory as well as a negli-
gent activity theory, but the defendant objected to and the trial court denied submission of
the negligent activity theory to the jury. Id. at 775.
16. Id. at 767.
17. Id.; see also 59 TEX. JUR. 3D Premises Liability §§ 15, 17 (2010) (explaining the rule
in Texas and most jurisdictions is that the extent of a landowner's liability for an injury
resulting from a condition of the premises is generally determined by the injured entrant's
status, absent explicit statutory expression to the contrary).
18. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 767.
19. Id. at 770.
20. Id. ("We hold only, on these facts, that during the ninety minutes of recurrent
hostilities at the bar, a duty arose on Del Lago's part to use reasonable care to protect the
invitees from imminent assaultive conduct.").
21. Id. at 772.
22. Id. at 770. The majority provides, "When a landowner 'has actual or constructive
knowledge of any condition on the premises that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to
invitees, he has a duty to take whatever action is reasonably prudent' to reduce or elimi-
nate that risk." Id. at 769 (quoting Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295
(Tex. 1983)).
23. Id. at 767; see also 59 TEX. JUR. 3D Premises Liability § 71 (2010) (stating an owner
of premises generally has no duty to protect against criminal conduct of third parties).
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unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee. '' 24 An owner
may have a duty to protect invitees if he has direct knowledge that crimi-
nal conduct is imminent or, if he lacks such knowledge, when past crimi-
nal conduct renders similar future conduct foreseeable. 25 The supreme
court previously held that the occurrence of prior criminal conduct af-
fected what an owner knew or should have known.26 Here, the supreme
court found the Timberwalk factors largely inapplicable and instead fo-
cused on the defendant's knowledge of immediately preceding conduct
and specific circumstances surrounding the injury.27 Ultimately, the Del
Lago court recognized a new factor impacting the foreseeability analy-
sis-that a duty may arise where the nature and character of the premises
increases the foreseeability of the criminal activity, even though that
criminal activity may be known to the plaintiff.2 8
In considering the facts, the Del Lago majority concluded that the na-
ture and character of a bar at closing time, with a previous ninety minutes
of heated altercations among intoxicated patrons, increased the foresee-
ability of the bar fight thereby imposing an affirmative duty upon the
landowner to guard against the risk of harm.29 The majority explained
that the applicable duty requires a premises owner either to warn invitees
of the dangerous condition adequately or to take prudent actions to make
the condition reasonably safe.30 Here, "Del Lago had actual and direct
knowledge that a [fight] was imminent" and had the "time and means to
defuse the situation."'31 The supreme court took great pains to emphasize
that it was not announcing a general rule, but was merely holding that
there are some circumstances in which a warning will always be inade-
quate and an owner must take affirmative steps to make the premises
safe. The facts in Del Lago presented just such a situation.32
Interestingly, the majority opinion considered Del Lago to be a case of
premises liability nonfeasance as contrasted with a negligent-activity case
of malfeasance.33 The dissent argued the case should be treated as a neg-
24. Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998)
(quoting Lefmark Mgmt. Co. v. Old, 946 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1997)).
25. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 768; Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756-57 (finding an owner
lacking direct knowledge of imminent criminal conduct still has a duty to protect against
such conduct if past criminal conduct made future conduct foreseeable).
26. See Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756-59 (analyzing the foreseeability of future in-
jury given past criminal conduct by considering proximity, recency, frequency, similarity,
and publicity).
27. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 768 (finding these "factors inapplicable to today's case").
28. Id. Relying upon the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 19 cmt. f (2010) and recent precedent, the majority explained that
there are situations where "criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable as to require a
full negligence analysis of the actor's conduct." Id. at 769.
29. Id. at 768-69.
30. Id. at 771.
31. Id. at 769.
32. The majority reasons that its holding is sensible because a bar sign stating "drink at
your own risk" does not discharge the defendant bar of its duty to take reasonable steps
such as calling security or otherwise acting earlier to prevent the fight. Id. at 771 n.32.
33. Relying on Timberwalk and Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992),
the majority explained that a negligent activity theory requires affirmative misconduct, or
[Vol. 64
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ligent activity claim, concluding the proper inquiry should focus on the
defendant's affirmative, contemporaneous conduct, that allegedly caused
the injury-or malfeasance.34 In contrast, a premises liability case focuses
on the landowner's failure to take measures to render the property safe-
or nonfeasance.35 The dissent disapproved treating Del Lago as one of
premises liability, explaining the facts lend themselves to a discussion
under a malfeasance theory rather than a nonfeasance theory.36 The ma-
jority concluded the case was properly tried and submitted under a prem-
ises liability theory, noting the supreme court has repeatedly considered
cases involving inadequate security as fitting neatly under premises liabil-
ity.37 Of course, the line between the two theories may at times be un-
clear as "almost every artificial condition can be [characterized as]
created by an activity." '38
The majority also persuasively explained that despite applying the law
as the three dissenting opinions would have it, Texas long ago adopted a
comparative fault statute providing apportionment of fault among par-
ties. 39 Because the Del Lago jury apportioned fault between Smith and
the defendant bar at 49% and 51%, respectively, Smith was not barred
from recovery. Apportionment of responsibility only reduced the
amount recoverable in judgment by 49%, equal to the percentage of fault
attributable to Smith.40 The majority persuasively characterized the as-
sumption-of-risk portions of the dissents from Justice Johnson and Justice
Hecht as thinly veiled attempts to revitalize a form of contributory negli-
gence or assumption of the risk as a complete bar to Smith's ability to
recover in this case.41
malfeasance; whereas a premises liability theory applies when a landowner has failed to
take measures to render the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or nonfeasance. See
Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 776.
34. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787 (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (arguing that because
Smith's complaint was not based on a "condition of the land," the proper inquiry is the
"contemporaneous acts and omissions of the Del Lago staff and invitees in the Grandstand
Bar," and is properly cast as a negligent activity case instead of a premises liability case).
35. Id. at 776 (majority opinion).
36. Id. at 788-90 (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (noting that while the supreme court has
recognized a duty of premises owners to take reasonable measures to protect others
against criminal conduct and has analyzed these cases as premises liability claims, these
cases included allegations of defendants' failure to employ adequate security measures,
which inherently included a defective physical condition of the premises that allegedly per-
mitted the criminal acts to occur).
37. See id. at 776 (majority opinion).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 772-73; see also Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975)
overruled on other grounds by Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978)
(abolishing the implied assumption of the risk doctrine as a complete defense to tort
liability).
40. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 772 (explaining the plaintiff's portion of responsibility for
his "own risky conduct is now absorbed into the allocation of damages"); id. at 772 n.34
(referencing the legislature's adoption of a comparative negligence scheme as conveying a
clear intent to apportion negligence rather than bar recovery).
41. Id. at 772-73. The dissenting justices take issue primarily with both (1) the failure
of the parties to preserve error properly on the issue of premises liability or negligent
activity and (2) the jury's factual findings where it apportioned 49% of the fault to the
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The major difference in Del Lago distinguishing it from what might
otherwise be an ordinary premises liability duty analysis is the supreme
court's fact-specific focus on the circumstances and the great deal of
weight it ultimately gave to the defendant's immediately preceding con-
duct and the nature and character of the defendant bar.42 The supreme
court's willingness to analyze whether a duty exists on such a case-by-case
basis is rather remarkable, especially where the defendant is a business in
a premises liability action. In the past, Texas courts have not seemed so
willing to find for plaintiffs against business defendants in prem-
ises-liability actions. 43
B. DuTY OF THE SOVEREIGN
The state is ordinarily insulated from liability under the doctrine of sov-
plaintiff and 51% of the fault to the defendant bar. See id. at 780, 787. Unfortunately, the
dissenting justices' positions lack legal support. Regarding Justice Johnson's dissent, the
majority complains: "Justice Johnson's view would effectively revive the doctrine of volun-
tary assumption of the risk as a complete bar to recovery, but the Texas proportionate
responsibility statute makes clear that a plaintiffs negligence bars recovery only 'if his
percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent."' Id. at 772 (quoting TEX. CIv.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 2011)). Regarding Justice Hecht's dissent, the
majority complains that while Justice Hecht relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 343A(1), which bars liability when an invitee is aware of the dangerous condition, he
ignores two important things: (1) most states and the Third Restatement have rejected this
outdated section of the Second Restatement and (2) even if the court did consider the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1), that section also comes with a relevant excep-
tion-that even though liability is barred when an invitee is aware of a dangerous condi-
tion, it is not similarly barred if "the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness." Id. at 773-74.
42. See id. at 769.
43. The Amarillo Court of Appeals also had an opportunity to address premises liabil-
ity issues in Laba] v. VanHouten, 322 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. denied).
In Laba], a watchdog kept on the lot of a used car and repair shop attacked plaintiff Dee-
Ann VanHouten. At the time of the attack, VanHouten was looking at a car in the back lot
of a used car garage. The dog, a pit bull recently injured and having just delivered a litter
of pups, attacked VanHouten, removing a portion of her leg muscle. VanHouten sued
Third Coast Auto Group (TCAG), the landowner that kept the dog on the premises for
protection of its establishment. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held VanHouten was an
invitee, thus TCAG owed her the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises
reasonably safe. Id. at 421. Whether a duty arose was determined, in part, by the foresee-
ability of the risk that a dog bite would occur. Id. The court of appeals concluded a dog
kept under such conditions would foreseeably become over-protective and dangerous, and
the evidence was legally sufficient for a jury to find TCAG breached its duty to
VanHouten, ultimately causing her injuries. Id. at 422-23. The Laba] decision is interest-
ing because the court of appeals clarified a complicated distinction among various articula-
tions of duty owed in dog bite cases involving premises liability. First, Texas law
distinguishes between owners of animals with known aggressive tendencies and owners of
animals that do not have an aggressive disposition. Id. at 420. Strict liability applies to the
former; however, owners of the latter may still be held liable if the plaintiff proves the
owner's negligent handling caused the injury inflicted by the dog. Id. Second, the law
distinguishes between the duty owed to invitees versus the duty owed to licensees. Id. at
421. Landowners have a duty not to injure licensees willfully, wantonly, or through gross
negligence. Id. A more burdensome duty is imposed if the injured party is an invitee; the
owner must exercise ordinary care to keep the premises reasonably safe. Id. These distinc-
tions are reiterations of present law.
[Vol. 64
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ereign immunity,44 but the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) carves out an
exception for personal injuries caused by premises defects.45 While the
TTCA subjects the government to premises liability, the recreational use
statute restricts its scope. 46 The recreational use statute essentially pro-
vides that the injured person is deemed a trespasser when a defective
condition occurring on government-owned property forms the basis of a
suit.47 The courts note the statute itself dictates a higher standard than
the true, common law standard of care owed to a trespasser. 48 Consistent
with statutory text, Texas courts require the plaintiff to prove the defen-
dant acted with gross negligence, malicious intent, or bad faith.49 Given
the statutory standard of gross negligence, the duty analysis for a prem-
ises defect claim involves a common law factor-balancing approach.50
Because the relevant duty is created by the recreational use statute,
courts must remain "mindful of [the statutory] text and purpose" in carry-
ing out a legal duty analysis.5 1 This past term, the Texas Supreme Court
and the Austin Court of Appeals examined the scope and application of
the legal duty owed by the government regarding characteristics of an
alleged premises defect.
1. Premises Liability and the Recreational Use Statute
In City of Waco v. Kirwan,52 the mother of a park visitor brought a
wrongful death action against the City of Waco based on an alleged prem-
ises defect after her son fell off a cliff's edge.5 3 The plaintiff's son, Brad
44. See Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex.
2001) (noting sovereign immunity protects the state from suits for damages unless waived);
Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405, 408 (Tex. 1997), superseded by statute, TEX.
Gov'T CODE §§ 2260.001-.018 (West 2011), as recognized in Gen. Servs. Comm'n, 39
S.W.3d at 595 (recognizing the state must waive its sovereign immunity to be sued for
damages, and the State did not waive its immunity from a suit for breach of contract
merely by entering into the contract); Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (Tex. 1847) ("A
state cannot be sued in her own courts without her own consent, and then only in the
manner indicated by that consent.").
45. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (West 2011) (waiving state im-
munity where a condition or use of real property causes personal injury or death otherwise
actionable under Texas law).
46. See id. § 102.022 (stating the governmental duty for a premises defect mirrors the
duty a private individual owes to licensees); id. § 75.002(f) (limiting the governmental duty
owed to persons engaging in recreation on government land to the same duty owed tres-
passers). In State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Tex. 2006), the supreme court made
clear the recreational use statute does not reinstate sovereign immunity, but only restricts
state liability by classifying the recreational user of state-owned premises as a trespasser
and requiring proof of gross negligence, malicious intent, or bad faith.
47. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(f).
48. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(d), (f); see City of Waco v. Kirwan,
298 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2009) (noting that while the statute "does not wholly adopt the
common-law trespasser standard, it does adopt the common-law gross negligence standard.
Thus, we refer to our traditional, common-law duty analysis ....").
49. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 620; see, e.g., Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975
S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. 1998).
50. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 623-24.
51. Id. at 624.
52. 298 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2009).
53. Id. at 620-21.
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McGehee, was sitting on the edge of the cliff at a Waco city park watch-
ing boat races when the rocks beneath him suddenly crumbled, causing
him to fall sixty feet to his death.54 Coming within the purview of the
recreational use statute, 55 this case presented the supreme court with an
opportunity to answer a question left open by its decision in Shumake56-
whether the city, as landowner, owes a duty to recreational users to warn
or protect against the dangers of naturally occurring conditions.
57
The supreme court ruled the recreational use statute, in most cases,
does not give rise to a general duty to protect or warn others against
dangers arising from naturally occurring land conditions. 58 To determine
whether a duty exists, the court balances "the risk, foreseeability, and
likelihood of injury [ ... ] against the social utility of the actor's conduct,
the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the con-
sequences of placing the burden on the defendant. '59 Applying the law
to these facts, the supreme court held the City did not owe McGehee a
duty to warn him against the dangers of the cliff.60 The court reasoned
that the magnitude of the burden often outweighs the foreseeability of
the risk of harm where the condition is a natural one. 61 The risk of harm
posed by the cliff in this case was foreseeable to both the City and Mc-
Gehee. Thus, the city had no duty to warn because the burden of impos-
ing a duty on landowners to protect against dangers a reasonable person
would anticipate outweighs the risk of harm. 62
The Kirwan decision leaves room for the future determination of
whether a duty to warn arises when a condition is naturally occurring, but
not open, obvious, or the kind a reasonable person would expect to en-
counter on the land. 63 The supreme court noted such a duty may arise if
the landowner knows of a hidden and dangerous natural condition in an
area frequented by recreational users, the landowner is aware of previous
deaths or injuries related to the danger, and the danger is not the type a
recreational user would expect to encounter on the property.64 In such a
case, the foreseeability and likelihood of the risk may outweigh the bur-
den of imposing a duty on the landowner.65 Nonetheless, whether the
54. Id. at 620.
55. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(f) (West 2011).
56. State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 279 (Tex. 2006). The condition in Shumake was
man-made and not naturally occurring like the cliff at issue here. Id. at 281. The Shumake
court held that under the recreational use statute, landowners have "no duty to warn or
protect trespassers from obvious defects or conditions." Id. at 288.
57. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622.
58. Id. at 622-23 (holding landowners generally have no duty to warn or protect
against dangers of natural conditions, but exceptions to this rule exist); see id. at 623-24 for
specific examples of potential exceptions to the no-duty-to-warn rule.
59. Id. at 623-24 (quoting Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539, 544
(Tex. 1998)).
60. Id. at 628.
61. Id. at 625.
62. Id. at 625-26.





supreme court will recognize such a duty if given the appropriate facts
remains to be seen.66 The supreme court additionally noted that while the
statute imposes a duty in circumstances involving artificially created con-
ditions,67 the facts in Kirwan did not require it to define the point at
which a natural condition will be sufficiently altered to become "artifi-
cial" and thus giving rise to an affirmative duty to warn.68
Following the supreme court's Kirwan opinion, Texas State Univer-
sity-San Marcos v. Bonnin69 seemed poised to address the boundaries of
the artificial-versus-natural distinction Kirwan left unanswered. 70 The
facts are tragic. Jason Bonnin worked at a Joe's Crab Shack overlooking
the San Marcos River on Texas State University-San Marcos grounds.71
While celebrating a colleague's final day at work, Jason and fellow em-
ployees were jumping from the Joe's Crab Shack deck into the river.72
"After his second jump, Jason was sucked into the undertow and became
trapped in the caverns beneath the restaurant, where he drowned. ' 73 His
parents sued the University alleging its repairs to the dam created an "un-
reasonably dangerous condition," and that the University negligently
failed to block access to the caverns. 74
On remand, the court of appeals discussed the Bonnins' negligence
claims and premises defect claims in turn.75 The court of appeals first
dismissed the negligence claims pertaining to the University's repairs to
the dam because the Bonnins based their design defect allegations on
discretionary acts of the University.76 Under the TTCA, the discretion-
ary acts exception effectively reinstates sovereign immunity.77 However,
the Bonnins based their premises defects claims on the turbulent under-
tow itself rather than the waterway repairs, thereby avoiding dismissal
under the discretionary acts exception. 78 The court of appeals distin-
guished the case from Shumake because unlike the man-made culvert in
Shumake, the turbulent undertow was a naturally occurring condition
falling squarely within Kirwan.79 The defect claims based on the turbu-
66. See id. at 627 ("[W]e do not hold that a party may never be liable for gross negli-
gence related to a natural condition-under some circumstances not present in this case, a
landowner may be liable.").
67. See Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 288.
68. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 627.
69. Tex. State Univ.-San Marcos v. Bonnin, 314 S.W.3d 912, 912 (Tex. 2010).
70. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 627.




75. Tex. State Univ.-San Marcos v. Bonnin, No. 03-07-00593-CV, 2010 WL 4367013, at
*2-3 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 05, 2010, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
76. See id. at *2.
77. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056 (West 2011); see Bonnin, 2010 WL
4367013, at *2.
78. Bonnin, 2010 WL 4367013, at *3.
79. Id. at *4. The court also presumed Shumake did not address the discretionary acts
exception of TTCA section 101.056 in connection with the design of the man-made culverts
because the parties failed to raise the issue. Id.
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
lent undertow were barred by sovereign immunity because there is no
general duty to warn or protect recreational users against naturally occur-
ring conditions.80 The court of appeals presumably did not undertake the
factor analysis laid out in Kirwan because the facts surrounding the dan-
ger of the undertow did not fit any of Kirwan's suggested exceptions. 81
The court of appeals instead followed Kirwan's overarching holding,
namely that there is no duty to warn where the condition is naturally
occurring. 82
What was once a hopeful avenue to injured plaintiffs after Shumake83
and Kirwan84 is now blanketed with reality by Bonnin. The facts seemed
perfectly aligned to analyze the strength of the connection between the
university's repairs to the waterway and the resulting undertow that ulti-
mately caused Jason's death and whether the natural condition-the
strength of the undertow-became artificial at some point due to the
changes brought on by the repairs.85 But neither Kirwan nor Shumake
mentioned the statutory question Bonnin put into issue-the effect of the
discretionary acts exception. The Bonnin court extinguished the poten-
tial viability of any natural-to-artificial argument. According to the court
of appeals, a premises defect claim, because it would be barred by the
discretional acts exception, ultimately turns on analyzing the design deci-
sion of the waterway repairs.86
2. Ordinary Premises Liability
Given the flurry of weather events that occurred throughout Texas this
past year, Reyes v. City of Laredo87 seemed perfect in its timing. Reyes
presented a significant decision for local governments and citizens alike,
as it clarified the level of actual knowledge required in a premises defect
suit brought against a governmental unit.88 As previously noted, the
TTCA limits governmental premises liability by restricting the state's
duty to protect only against premises defects of which it has actual knowl-
edge.89 This limitation does not extend to cases involving special
80. Id.
81. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
82. See Bonnin, 2010 WL 4367013, at *4.
83. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
84. See City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 627 (Tex. 2009) (noting the facts of
the case did not require the supreme court to define the point when a landowner trans-
forms the "natural" to the "artificial" in a premises defect suit).
85. See Bonnin, 314 S.W.3d at 912-13.
86. Bonnin, 2010 WL 4367013, at *4 n.5.
87. Reyes v. City of Laredo, No. 09-1007, 2010 WL 4909963 (Tex. Dec. 3, 2010) (per
curiam).
88. Id. at *3-5.
89. This is the same duty a private landowner owes to a licensee, which is a lesser
standard than that owed to invitees. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a)
(West 2011) (stating that except for toll roads the government "owes to the claimant only
the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant




"Maria Reyes sued the City of Laredo for the wrongful death of her
fourteen-year-old daughter, who drowned when the van in which she and
her family were riding ... was swept away in flash flood waters."9 1 The
area was flooded by an overflowing creek and had risen during a rain-
storm. 92 Upholding the court of appeals' determination, the supreme
court held that the rain-flooded street was not a special defect. 93 Dispos-
ing the special defect issue meant the City only had a duty to warn motor-
ists of the flooding if it actually knew of the flooding. 94 The supreme
court and the lower court differed on this point. The appellate court held
the City had actual knowledge of the flooded street.95 A nearby home-
owner who had "a clear view of the accident site" started calling 911 sev-
eral hours before the incident occurred to inform the City the creek "was
rising and that there [would] be a problem with cars getting swept away if
something was not done."'96 The homeowner placed four or five calls of
the same nature thereafter.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals holding
the City lacked actual knowledge. 97 The supreme court stated no infer-
ence could be made regarding the City's actual knowledge that the area
flooded, much less its knowledge when the accident occurred.98 Mere
"[a]wareness of a potential problem is not actual knowledge of an ex-
isting danger." 99 Even though the City knew the crossing had previously
flooded during heavy rains, actual knowledge requires the City to have
knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time of the accident, not
mere knowledge of a possibility that a dangerous condition could de-
velop. The supreme court continued, stating that if testimony existed evi-
dencing a 911 call giving the operator "a credible report at about the time
of the accident that the crossing had actually flooded and was imperiling
90. Id. § 101.022(b). Generally, special defects include "excavations or obstructions
on highways, roads, or streets." Id. If the defect is considered a special defect, the govern-
ment's duty becomes that which a private landowner owes to an invitee. Denton County v.
Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2009). The government must "use ordinary care to
protect an invitee from a dangerous condition of which the [government] is or reasonably
should be aware." Id.
91. Reyes, 2010 WL 4909963, at *1.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *1, *3.
94. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a); State Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992) ("A licensee must prove that the
premises owner actually knew of the dangerous condition, while an invitee need only prove
that the owner knew or reasonably should have known.").
95. Reyes, 2010 WL 4909963, at *1. "The court of appeals concluded that 'Sanchez's
statements, and the reasonable inferences from those statements, were sufficient to raise a
fact issue on whether the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time
of the accident."' Id. at *4.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *5.
98. Id. at *4 ("[T]he most one can reasonably infer about what the City knew is that at
12:30 a.m., Chacon Creek was rising, that 'there was going to be a problem' at some point,




motorists," the City would then possess the requisite actual knowledge of
a dangerous condition °100
Consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's analysis in Kirwan and the
general notion of restricting the government's liability exposure as seen
in Bonnin, the supreme court again declined to recognize an existing duty
in Reyes. However, after the facts posited by Reyes, actual knowledge
invokes a high burden for plaintiffs to satisfy. Reyes leaves little room, if
any, to infer a governmental unit's knowledge, even if the evidence sug-
gests it would be reasonable to do so. In defining the actual knowledge
requirement, the Reyes decision seems to encourage willful blindness by
the state.
C. DUTY TO WARN UNDER THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
In Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 0 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
addressed whether Texas recognizes an exception to the learned interme-
diary doctrine when a drug manufacturer fails to warn a patient of ad-
verse effects caused by the drug and directly advertises the drug to its
consumers.102 In Centocor, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the
drug Remicade after developing "a drug-induced lupus-like syn-
drome.' u0 3 The drug manufacturer defended against the claim of fraud
by arguing, inter alia, that the learned intermediary doctrine precluded
imposition of liability.10 4
The Centocor court chose to "recognize an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine when a drug manufacturer directly advertises [false
statements] to its consumers. 10 5 The learned intermediary doctrine ordi-
narily relieves a drug manufacturer from liability if it adequately warns
the physician, but the court of appeals carved out an exception when the
purpose of the doctrine is undermined.10 6 According to the court of ap-
peals, the doctrine was formed during an era when drug manufacturers
did not normally advertise their products directly to consumers and pa-
tients relied on information provided to them by their doctors.10 7 Ade-
quate warnings to the physician cut off the manufacturer's liability
because the doctrine served to adequately warn the patient as well.108
100. Id.
101. Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010, no
pet. h.).
102. Id. at 480.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 480-81. The learned intermediary doctrine allows a manufacturer of a prod-
uct to rely upon an intermediary, such as a physician, to pass along warnings to the prod-
uct's ultimate consumer, the patient, thereby avoiding imposition of liability for a failure to
warn the patient. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharm., 526 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2008);
Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex. 1986); Coleman v. Cintas
Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
105. Centocor, 310 S.W.3d at 481.
106. Id. at 507-08.
107. Id. at 506-07.
108. Id. at 480 (opining that warning the physician was sufficient because pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers did not directly advertise their products to patients).
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However, when the manufacturer directly advertises to the patient in a
misleading fashion, the underlying assumptions of the doctrine no longer
apply.10 9 The manufacturer cannot then rely on its warnings to the physi-
cian to satisfy its duty to warn the ultimate consumer.110
The Centocor opinion is an important event in Texas law because it
essentially expounds upon previous law to accommodate industry
changes regarding pharmaceutical advertising.11' In the words of the
court of appeals: "Our medical-legal jurisprudence is based on images of
health care that no longer exist."1112 Pursuant to Centocor, patients may
have a cause of action against the drug manufacturer if the direct adver-
tising was misleading even though the drug manufacturer believed it dis-
charged its duty via the learned intermediary doctrine by adequately
warning physicians of the dangers and adverse consequences of a particu-
lar drug.113
III. REPOSE STATUTE AS ABSOLUTE BAR IN ALL MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
The Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution provides that "all
courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law."'1 4 The statute of repose found in section 74.251 of the TTCA bars
all healthcare liability claims brought ten years after the date on which
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurs.115 In the following two "surgi-
cal sponge" cases, the Texas Supreme Court discusses the time limits
placed on medical malpractice suits.
In Walters v. Cleveland Regional Medical Center,116 Tangie Walters re-
ceived a tubal ligation following the birth of her child.11 7 Not long after
the surgery, she complained of abdominal cramping, which continued to
bother her thereafter." 8 A nurse initially told Tangie the pain was an
109. Id. at 507-08 (reasoning the doctrine is undermined because patients ask for drugs
by name after seeing advertisements, and the role physicians play in the patient-physician
relationship is significantly diminished due to direct marketing).
110. Id. at 508.
111. See id. at 503-05 (noting various courts have carved out an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine where the doctor's role in the decision-making process and
drug selection has diminished, and it is less likely warnings will be adequately conveyed to
the patient). For examples of cases recognizing an exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine for claims involving oral contraceptives, see Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985), and MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
112. Centocor, 310 S.W.3d at 480 (quoting Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245,
1246-47 (N.J. 1999)).
113. Id. at 499 (recognizing an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine when
drug manufacturers directly advertise to consumers in a manner which "fraudulently touts
the drug's efficacy while failing to warn of the risks").
114. TEX. CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
115. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251(b) (West 2011).
116. Walters v. Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 307 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. 2010).




after-effect of childbirth; her doctor later attributed the pain to nurs-
ing.119 The health problems, doctor visits, and wrong diagnoses resulting
after were daunting. Among other ailments, Tangie experienced fatigue,
insomnia, infections, uterine problems, bladder problems, chronic pain,
and cysts. 120 Nine-and-a-half years after Tangie's surgery, a surgeon dis-
covered a sponge had been left inside her abdomen.121 Within two
months of its discovery, Tangie sued the Cleveland Regional Medical
Center, the doctor who operated on her, and the doctor's assistant.122
In considering her case, the supreme court reaffirmed its holding in
Neagle v. Nelson123 rendered twenty-five years earlier if a patient brings a
foreign-object suit after the two-year statute of limitations expires but
within a reasonable period of time, the patient may use the Open Courts
provision to overcome the statutory limitations period. 124 "Sponge cases"
warrant providing patients with a longer period of time to bring suit be-
cause the injury is difficult to discover, and the wrongdoing and identity
of the one who committed the wrong are typically undisputed.125 Walters
articulates an additional reason for the supreme court's long-time holding
that foreign-object claims can survive the two-year statute of limitations
ordinarily applicable to medical malpractice actions through the Open
Courts provision. To hold otherwise would render the repose statute su-
perfluous: if the two-year statute of limitations acted as an absolute bar,
the legislature's ten-year statute of repose would be unnecessary and
meaningless. 26
While Walters held the statute of repose was an absolute bar to all
medical malpractice claims, even those brought by foreign-objects claim-
ants, Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rankin127
called into question the constitutionality of the statute itself. Rankin
presented a face-off between the ten-year statute of repose and the Open
Courts provision of the Texas Constitution. 128
In November 1995, Emmalene Rankin underwent a hysterectomy.1 29
Nearly eleven years later, she was told that a surgical sponge had been
left in her abdomen during the surgery. 130 She filed suit soon after
against the hospital where the procedure was performed and the two phy-
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 295.
122. Id.
123. Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1985).
124. Waiters, 307 S.W.3d at 294; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; Neagle, 685 S.W.2d at
12; Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 290 (Tex.
2010).
125. Walters, 307 S.W.3d at 294.
126. Id. at 298.
127. 307 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. 2010).
128. Id. at 284.




sicians who participated in the procedure. 131 The defendants argued
Rankin's claims were barred by the ten-year statute of repose. 132 Before
the supreme court for the first time was the issue of whether the Open
Courts provision trumped the statute of repose. 133
The supreme court upheld the statute's constitutionality and held that
all healthcare liability claims are subject to the absolute time bar set by
the legislature in the statute-a limit of ten years. 34 The supreme court
stated the statute was not an unreasonable, and therefore not an uncon-
stitutional, exercise of legislative power simply because Rankin was de-
prived of her right to sue before she had an opportunity to discover the
sponge.' 35 The court explained that focusing on the individual loss of
Rankin's right to redress her wrongs "ignores the broader societal con-
cerns that spurred the Legislature to act.' 36 The supreme court upheld
the repose statute as a reasonable policy decision by the Legislature to
increase affordability of and accessibility to healthcare. 137
IV. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
A. No LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES
In Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh,138 the plaintiff Naifeh was an employee of
Physio, an occupational and physical therapy clinic owned by the
Saadats. 139 While Naifeh was employed at Physio, Tanja Saadat allegedly
"consistently falsif[ied] Naifeh's patient treatment documents to include
additional services that were not performed [in order to receive] higher
payments from insurers. ' 140 Wanting no part in this misconduct, "Naifeh
repeatedly refused to sign these altered treatment documents and was
eventually fired" as a result. 141 Naifeh then brought a wrongful termina-
tion action against the Saadats, claiming they terminated her for refusing
to perform an unlawful act. 142
Because Texas is an employment-at-will jurisdiction, any party to an
employment contract can terminate the contract absent an agreement to
the contrary between the parties. 143 Despite this doctrine, Texas allows a
131. Id. The 1995 hysterectomy was performed at Southwest Texas Methodist Hospital.
Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 284.
134. Id. at 284-85.
135. Id. at 284-85, 287 (noting review of a statute's constitutionality creates a presump-
tion that the Legislature did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily).
136. Id. at 287.
137. Id. at 287-88 (noting "a spike in healthcare-liability claims [launched] an insurance
crisis" because indeterminate periods of potential liability increase the insurance "rates
that insurers must charge").
138. Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh, 306 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,
no pet. h.).




143. Id.; see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993).
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former employee to sue the employer in tort for wrongful termination if
the employee can establish that he or she was fired for refusing to per-
form an illegal act. 144 This exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
is generally referred to in Texas as the Sabine Pilot doctrine. 145 The
Physio case presents an issue of first impression, namely whether individ-
ual employees working for an employer can be held personally liable in
tort for committing a wrongful discharge violation.
1 46
The imposition of individual liability is controversial, as illustrated by
the jurisdictional split presently existing throughout the states. 147 Some
states permit individual liability for wrongful discharge for one's failure
to perform a criminal act, reasoning that individuals should be responsi-
ble for their own torts even if they are acting as agents on behalf of their
employers at the time of their wrongful conduct. 14 8 These jurisdictions
take the position that individual tort liability provides a much needed
deterrent against such wrongful conduct. 149 The Houston Fourteenth
Court of Appeals rejected this reasoning, siding with jurisdictions refus-
ing to impose individual liability on anyone besides the employer even if
the employee who wrongfully fired the individual is a supervisor or owner
of the business. 150 The dissent concluded the majority's reasoning was
flawed, persuaded by contrary rationale. 151 Unlike the majority, the dis-
sent was not persuaded that only the employer Physio had power to ter-
minate Naifeh's employment. According to the dissent, the majority's
reasoning rested on a legal fiction because "no one disputes the effective-
ness of [the defendant's] termination" of the plaintiff's employment.15 2
Restricting the source of duty in a wrongful discharge tort solely to the
employer-employee relationship has significant implications, as it in ef-
fect undermines the Sabine Pilot doctrine, which serves a public interest
by discouraging criminal acts. 153
B. AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
An additional case that addressed a different issue arising from the
144. Physio, 306 S.W.3d at 887-88; Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,
735 (Tex. 1985).
145. See e.g., Physio, 306 S.W.3d at 887-88 (referring to the Sabine Pilot doctrine).
146. See id. at 888.
147. For examples of cases holding individuals personally liable for their own torts,
even when they are acting as the employer's agents, see Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764
N.W.2d 751, 775-77 (Iowa 2009), Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Authority, 800 A.2d 97,
110-11 (N.J. 2002), and Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 698-99 (W.
Va. 1982). For examples of cases holding individual liability is not permitted for a wrongful
discharge action, see Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 188 P.3d 629, 644-45 (Cal. 2008)
and Schram v. Albertson's, Inc. 934 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
148. Physio, 306 S.W.3d at 888; see also supra note 145.
149. Physio, 306 S.W.3d at 888; see also supra note 145.
150. Physio, 306 S.W.3d at 888.
151. Id. at 890 (Harvey, J., dissenting).
152. Id. ("In the real world, no one disputes the fact that Naifeh was fired by Tanja
Saadat.").
153. Id. at 890-91 (noting the wrongful discharge committed in this case is "the very
behavior Sabine Pilot was [intended] to prevent").
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Sabine Pilot context was Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez.154 Safeshred ad-
dressed for the first time whether punitive damages are available in a
Sabine Pilot cause of action. Answering in the affirmative, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that punitive damages are indeed available to
plaintiffs wrongfully discharged for refusing to engage in illegal
conduct. 155
In Safeshred, Martinez was fired because he refused to drive a truck
failing to meet regulatory safety requirements.1 56 While the supreme
court's Sabine Pilot decision failed to expressly address which damages
would be available to wrongfully discharged plaintiffs, Justice Kilgarlin's
concurrence in Sabine Pilot suggested punitive damages were available in
such an action. 157 In Safeshred, the court of appeals adopted Justice Kil-
garlin's view, stating recoverable damages include loss of wages, employ-
ment retirement benefits, and punitive damages.158 The court of appeals
further reasoned that punitive damages are not only appropriate in a
wrongful discharge action, but are also proper and necessary to deter
criminal conduct "by prohibiting employers from firing employees for
refus[ing] to commit illegal acts.' '1 59
The Safeshred court's rationale seems somewhat inconsistent with the
Physio decision, which refused to recognize individual liability based on
public policy interests in deterring criminal conduct. 60 The dissent in
Safeshred disagreed with the majority's decision making punitive dam-
ages available. 16' The dissent argued that a decision regarding the appro-
priateness of punitive damages is more properly left to the legislature,
which can more satisfactorily balance and consider important public pol-
icy concerns.' 62
154. Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 310 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet.
granted).
155. Id. at 661. The Texas Supreme Court recently clarified the standards for reviewing
punitive damage awards, which accounts for the increasingly strict due process scrutiny
imposed by the United States Supreme Court. See Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867,
873-83 (Tex. 2010); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-86 (1996)
(providing a three-part framework as the standards courts should use to identify unconsti-
tutionally excessive awards, which include the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct,
the disparity between actual or potential harm suffered and punitive damages awarded,
and the difference between a jury's award and civil penalties authorized in comparable
cases). In Bennett, the jury awarded $1.25 million in exemplary damages against Bennett
for conversion of his neighbor's cattle. 315 S.W.3d at 869. The Texas Supreme Court up-
held the award of exemplary damages, but found the amount unconstitutionally excessive
and remanded the case back to the appellate court for remittitur consistent with an appro-
priate ratio analysis. Id. at 885.
156. Safeshred, 310 S.W.3d at 654-57.
157. Id. at 659 (citing Sabine Pilot Serv., 687 S.W.2d at 736 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring)).
158. Id. at 659-61.
159. Id. at 660.
160. See supra notes 136-151 and accompanying text.
161. Safeshred, 310 S.W.3d at 669 (Puryear, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Id. A remaining question left unanswered by Safeshred is whether mental anguish
damages are available to Sabine Pilot plaintiffs. The majority in Safeshred declined to
answer because it disposed the issue, finding Martinez failed to present sufficient evidence




The recent opinions of the supreme court this past term bring to the
forefront the importance of defining the scope and application of legal
duties recognized in Texas tort law. Del Lago Partners, Inc. presented an
unexpected shift in the usual premises liability outcome. The supreme
court's willingness to undertake a fact-specific analysis and impose a duty
upon the business owner was remarkable, as was the supreme court's pro-
mulgation of a new factor impacting the foreseeability analysis-the na-
ture and character of the premises.
The supreme court also examined the contours of the duty owed under
the recreational use statute in Kirwan, making clear there is no general
duty to warn or protect recreational users against the dangers of naturally
occurring land conditions. Bonnin additionally emphasized the inability
of plaintiffs to sue the government for premises defects where the basis of
the claim involves discretionary acts. When the discretionary acts excep-
tion applies, sovereign immunity is not waived. Reyes reiterated that
where a governmental unit is not covered by the recreational use statute,
the government only has a duty to warn of premises defects if it has ac-
tual knowledge of an existing danger. After Reyes, the actual knowledge
threshold can rarely (if ever) be inferred, making it a difficult standard
for plaintiffs to satisfy. Centocor exemplifies the changing pharmaceuti-
cal industry and voids the effect of the learned intermediary doctrine by
holding manufacturers who advertise directly to their consumers account-
able. Finally, two cases from the courts of appeals considered whom
plaintiffs may sue in tort for wrongful discharge violations and what dam-
ages are available. The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals expressly
stated individual liability for a wrongful discharge may not be imposed on
anyone other than the employer. However, exemplary damages remain
available in a Sabine Pilot action, at least by the recent ruling of the Aus-
tin Court of Appeals.
See id. at 667 n.28. The majority made clear its finding does not affect or decide whether
these damages are available. Id.
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